justification for shareholder primacy. 'All thoughtful people', Hansmann and Kraakman tell us:
believe that corporate enterprise should be organized and operated to serve the interests of society as a whole, and that the interests of shareholders deserve no greater weight in this social calculus than do the interests of any other members of society.The point is simply that now, as a consequence of both logic and experience, there is a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests.16 This is echoed by the Company Law Review's assertion that the 'overall objective' of company law should be'pluralist', in the sense that 'companies should be run in a way which maximises overall competitiveness and wealth and welfare for all', but that this is best promoted by getting directors to act in the 'collective best interests of shareholders'.17 The growing popularity of such views have generated a company law version of the veil of ignorance, in that while much continues to be written about the ways in which everyone allegedly, indirectly and rather abstractly benefits from shareholder primacy, very little has been written about the composition of the 'shareholder class' which directly and quite concretely benefits from it. In more inquisitive times this might have raised a few suspicious academic eyebrows. In an era of neo-liberalism and law-and-economics, however, it seems to elicit only sage academic nods. This paper seeks to lift this particular veil and to elucidate the make-up of the shareholder class whose interests are increasingly being portrayed as the interests of all.To this end it examines financial property ownership in the US and the UK, the countries in which share ownership has become most widely spread, highlighting the distributional dimensions of corporate governance which so many advocates of shareholder primacy wish to suppress.18 The paper argues that although the base of the financial-property-owning pyramid has indeed widened in recent years, the distribution of financial wealth in general and share ownership in particular both continue to be skewed in the extreme, with the result that shareholder primacy is, in reality, the primacy of a small, privileged elite. It moves on to look at the contradictions of middle and working class shareholding and at the impact of a strengthened shareholder primacy norm on the distribution of wealth. It concludes with a re-evaluation of Hansmann and Kraakman's thesis, suggesting that the spread of the shareholder-oriented corporation is a triumph not for economic logic or efficiency but for the growing political power of the 16 Hansmann and Kraakman, n 2 above, 441. 17 CLR, n 5 above, paras 2.21-2.22. 18 Exemplified by Easterbrook and Fischel's claim that the contractual nature of the corporation 'removes from the field of interesting questions one that has plagued many writers: what is the goal of the corporation? Is it profit, and for whom? Social welfare more broadly defined? Is there anything wrong with corporate charity? Should corporations try to maximise profit over the long-run or the short-run? Our response to these questions is: who cares?': The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP,1991) 36.
shareholder class. It is the forceful promotion by the US of the interests of finance, the paper argues, that underlies the 'new imperialism'.
TOWARDS A SHARE-OWNING DEMOCRACY?
The rise of the 'equity culture ' Some years ago, newspapers in Britain featured an advertisement depicting a man lying on a sofa. The man was not only working, we were told, but working very profitably. If at first glance this was difficult to fathom because he didn't appear to be doing anything at all, the small print provided an explanation. The man, it transpired, had been wise enough to invest his money in a particular financial institution which had made prudent investments on his behalf, with the result that as he lay there relaxing on the sofa, his money was, so to speak, working for him. It was, moreover, doing so incessantly, for the money 'never slept'. In amore hip, contemporary variation on this theme, an advertisement recently appeared in the US picturing a man lying around in bed, headphones on, NASDAQ on the screen of his laptop. 'From the trading floor to the dance floor without leaving your pyjamas', the caption jubilantly declared. 19 At the time that the man on the sofa made his appearance in the late 1980s, Britain was experiencing a rapid and dramatic growth in the number of people owning financial property of one sort or another.20 In 1980 the government had decided to increase the state pension in line with prices rather than in line with gross earnings, with the result that the relative value of the basic pension began to fall, tumbling from20 per cent of average earnings in the late1970s to under15 per cent in 2001.21 It simultaneously began actively to encourage people to find alternative ways of saving and providing for their old age, introducing an alphabet soup of tax-favoured forms of saving and investment. PEPs (Personal Equity Plans)were introduced in1987 followed by TESSAs (Tax-Exempt Special Savings Accounts) in 1991,22 to be replaced by ISAs (Individual Savings Accounts) in 1999. Personal pensions were introduced in1988 and stakeholder pensions in 2001.23 All these savings vehicles encouraged individuals to become direct or indirect owners of shares and other forms of financial property. So too did the increasing, if ill starred, use of endowment policies to finance mortgage borrowing and the encouragement given to employers to establish tax-favoured employee share ownership (ESOP) schemes aimed at persuading employees to build up their equity stakes in the companies for which they worked. By 1990 there were, according to the CBI, around 900 profit-sharing share schemes and 1,000 savings-related share-option schemes in operation, covering 20 per cent of listed British companies and nearly two million workers.24 By far the biggest single cause of the dramatic increase in direct share ownership, however, was privatization. Started in the early 1980s as a limited programme for returning a few public utilities to private ownership25, privatization had by the late 1980s been transformed into a major policy for 'rolling back the state' and 'restoring the market'. The telephone system was sold, as was the gas industry and the electricity generating and distribution industries. Jaguar and Rover cars were sold, along with Rolls Royce aeroengines, British Aerospace, British Steel and the government's stake in BP. The national airline was sold, and so too were seven national airports, including Heathrow and Gatwick. The water supply and sewage industries were sold, followed later by the railways and the Post Office. It was, in the triumphant words of Madsen Pirie of the Adam Smith Institute, 'the largest transfer of power and property since the dissolution of the monasteries under Henry VIII'.26 Levels of direct share ownership were further boosted by the building society demutualizations which began in the late 1980s and which by the end of the 1990s had seen over 80 per cent of building society assets transferred to public companies. Whereas at the beginning of the 1980s, fewer than one in ten households owned shares directly, by the end of the decade the figure had risen to more than one in five. 27 As private pensions grew in popularity and others followed the British privatization vanguard,28 the 1980s and 1990s witnessed significant increases in stock market participation in many countries, generating the rise of the so-called' equity culture'.29 In the US, for example, the decade after 1989 saw the number of individuals owning corporate stock, directly or indirectly, increase by nearly 60 per cent, mainly as a result of the expansion of retirement savings plans and the growth of investment in equity mutual funds. According to James Poterba, 24 P. Saunders and C. Harris, Privatization and Popular Capitalism (Buckingham: Open University Press,1994) 5. 25 Despite specific commitments to sell council houses and to return aerospace and shipbuilding to private ownership, there was no general commitment to privatization in the 1979 Conservative Manifesto. It emphasized, rather, controlling the money supply, reducing public expenditure and cutting income tax. The policy of mass privatization only emerged during the second and third Thatcher terms and was used in part as a way of reducing the public sector borrowing requirement without engaging in politically unpopular cuts in public expenditure; as a way of circumventing the fiscal constraints associated with monetarism: See T. Clarke, 'The Political Economy of the UK Privatization Programme', in T. Clarke and C. Pitelis Professor of Economics at MIT, thirty million Americans became stockholders in the 1990s, a 'far greater change in the segment of the population owning stock than in any earlier postwar decade'.30 Confirming this, a recent study estimates that by January 2002 52.7 million US households (49.5 per cent) and 84.3 million investors owned equities, directly or indirectly.31 In Europe, by the end of the 1990s 17.3 per cent of households in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK were holding stocks directly, with British households showing the highest rate of direct participation at 27.9 per cent. When indirect ownership was taken into account the overall stock market participation rate of households rose to nearly 50 per cent in the UK, 33 per cent in the Netherlands, 23 per cent in France, 20 per cent in Germany and 15 per cent in Italy.32 As in Britain and the US, the main factors behind the spread of the equity culture in Europe were the transformation of the financial sector,33 the privatization of public utilities34 and pension reform.35 Indeed, researchers are now earnestly investigating why so many households do not have direct or indirect holdings of stocks -what has come to be known as 'the stockholding puzzle'.36
'Taking capitalism to the people': equity culture and class identity
What is the wider significance of these developments? In Britain, the expansion of share ownership underlay claims by the then Conservative government that they were 'taking capitalism to the people'.37 Thus the goal of privatization, according to Nigel Lawson, who as Chancellor of the Exchequer was one of its main architects, was to encourage the creation of 'an ever-widening share owning democracy'.38 John Moore, Financial Secretary to the Treasury from 1983-1986 and responsible for the initial stages of the programme, confirmed that it had not only rescued 'a whole economy headed for disaster', but had shown 'an unrivalled power to teach the responsibilities and rewards of a free society'. 30 See Poterba, ibid. 31 Investment Company Institute (ICI) and Securities Industry Association (SIA), Equity Ownership in America (2002). 32 Guiso et al, n 28 above, 3. 33 The advent of mutual funds and other financial intermediaries made stock ownership easier, and technological advances (associated in the UK with the 'Big Bang') lowered the transaction costs of trades and made individual share trading possible. 34 Particularly in the UK and Italy. The privatization process has been much slower in places like Germany. 35 Guiso, Haliossos and Jappelli argue that the success in the US of IRAs (individual retirement accounts) and the move from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pension schemes inspired European policymakers. However, although Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy have all experienced increases in pension fund assets, there are still significant differences both between European countries and between Europe and the US .While pension fund assets are over 90 per cent of GDP in the Netherlands, for example, and around 60 per cent in the US, they are less than 10 per cent in France, Italy and Germany, where public pension schemes continue to dominate: see Guiso et al, n 28 above, 5-6. 36 Privatization, he opined, was capable of 'transforming public attitudes towards economic responsibility and the concept of private property', on which basis he recommended its 'widest possible extension'. It was 'an educational process' through which people could grasp 'the fundamental beliefs and values of free enterprise'.39 Amidst claims of this sort, privatization swept across the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s,40 by which time the spotlight had shifted to the importance of people making their own private pension provision, adding new purpose to the need to establish 'share-owning democracies'. Ideally, everyone should become a sufficiently substantial owner of financial property to be able to provide for themselves in old age. While, as we shall see, it is far from clear whether anything like the 'people's capitalisms' envisaged by Lawson have materialized, there is evidence, particularly in those countries where financial property ownership has become most widespread, that there has been a shift in public attitudes along the lines hoped for by Moore and that this has contributed to the recent strengthening of the shareholder primacy norm. There are, for example, frequent allusions in the contemporary literature on corporate governance to widening share ownership and increasing public awareness of the stock market. More and more of us have become shareholders, it is argued, and the direct beneficiaries of shareholder primacy are increasingly widely spread. It is not insignificant that when Lawrence Mitchell, a leading academic critic of existing American corporate governance practices, asks 'who is the stockholder?', he answers 'you and me'.41 The ideological importance of this is spelled out and, indeed, emphasised, by Hansmann and Kraakman. In seeking to account for the growing support for shareholder primacy, they point not only to the 'important economic forces [that] have made the virtues of that model increasingly salient', but to 'the rise of the shareholder class', placing considerable weight on the fact that stock ownership'is becoming more pervasive everywhere' and is 'no longer . . . confined to a small group ofwealthycitizens'. They note, in particular, the ever-increasing number of workers who have invested savings in corporate equities through pension funds and the rapid growth of the mutual fund industry as the 'repository of an ever increasing share of non pension savings for the population at large'. The result, they argue, has been a 'rapid expansion' of equity ownership 'within broad segments of society' and 'the emergence of a public shareholder class' which is a coherent, 'broad and powerful interest group in both corporate and political affairs across jurisdictions'. This has forged a 'fundamental realignment of interest group structures in developed economies'. With 'even blue-collar workers now often hav [ing] 
WHOSE PRIMACY?
Despite the importance attached to widening share ownership, however, little energy is expended elaborating the composition of the shareholder class. Even in Britain and the United States, the countries most associated with equity culture and the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation, there is little discussion of how shares and other forms of financial property are distributed. Nor is much interest expressed in how the much vaunted, wider dispersal of financial property has impacted on the distribution of wealth. It is not, of course, easy to paint an accurate portrait of the shareholder class, not least because so many shares are held by institutions of one kind or another.43 In the UK, for example, institutional investors -insurance companies, pension funds, unit trusts, investment trusts and the like -collectively account for about 70 per cent of listed equities.44 In these contexts, not only is the beneficial 'ownership' of the property concerned diffuse, it is difficult to trace.45 Even in mutual funds, where investments are usually held in segregated accounts, there is no direct link between investors and companies, as the unit-holders of the mutual fund do not actually own the shares in the fund's portfolio. Despite these complications, however, it is possible to make reasonably accurate estimates of the distribution of financial wealth and share ownership using the information elicited by household surveys.46 In what follows, I concentrate on the US and the UK, homes of the Anglo-American, shareholder-oriented, dispersed-ownership model of corporate governance. , mainly as a result of the growth in employer-sponsored retirement plans through which nearly half of the equity owning households were introduced to share ownership. This expansion of ownership prompts Mitchell to suggest that 'things are looking up as far as the distribution of corporate wealth is concerned'.48 However, while the ICI/SIA studies record the gradual spread of ownership, they do not in fact provide much data about its depth or distribution, beyond telling us that most equity investing households have 'portfolios of moderate value' and that the typical investor is 'middle-aged, married and college-educated'.49 Although information on the distribution of income50 is more plentiful than that on the distribution of wealth,51 the importance of the latter is increasingly being recognised by researchers because of its centrality to life chances and economic security and well-being. 50 Income tax returns provide good, high-frequency sources of data on these money flows. 51 The term 'wealth' refers to the current value of the assets owned by households, less liabilities and debts. 'Assets' covers everything from financial assets (such as bank accounts, stocks and shares, and life insurance savings), to houses, pension rights, business equity and consumer durables (such as cars); liabilities cover things such as consumer debt and mortgage balances. The more specific term 'financial wealth' refers to resources or assets which give rise to a flow of income in the form of interest or dividend payments: see Banks and Tanner, n 22 above, 2. Certain forms of wealthmost notably those that take the form of rights to uncertain future benefits (pension rights, life insurance, entitlements to future government transfers (including 'social security wealth')) - 57 Because housing as a form of wealth is limited: 'you can borrow against accumulated equity, but you can't liquidate that equity easily without moving on to the sidewalk': Henwood, n 52 above, 122. 58 E. N. Wolff, Top Heavy (New York: New Press, 2002), 1-3. The term 'marketable wealth' (or net worth) refers to the current value of all the marketable assets owned by households less debts and liabilities. Marketable assets include real estate; cash and demand deposits; time and savings deposits, certificates of deposit, and money market accounts; government bonds, corporate bonds or other financial securities; cash surrender value of any life insurance plans or pension plans (including IRAs, Keogh and 401(k) plans); corporate stock or mutual funds; net equity in unincorporated businesses; equity in trust funds. Total liabilities include mortgage, consumer or other debts. Only assets readily convertible into cash are considered 'marketable', so consumer durables (cars, TVs etc) are usually excluded, as are the value of future social security benefits which might be received on retirement and the value of retirement benefits from pension plans, which although a source of future income are not in the direct control of their beneficiaries and cannot be marketed. evidence that 'the vast bulk of household wealth is concentrated in the richest families'.60 Not surprisingly, debt as a share of assets also varied hugely across the wealth distribution, the bottom half being by far the most leveraged: between1983-1998 their debt as a proportion of assets averaged 56.2 per cent, compared to under three per cent for the wealthiest one per cent. Indeed, the 1998 figures, Wolff argues, point to the growing indebtedness of the American family, the overall debt-equity ratio having climbed sharply to 0.176 in 1998 from 0.151 in 1983. This, together with their falling financial reserves, he suggests, accounts for 'the growing anxiety of the middle class'.61Most 'remarkable' of all, however, in Kennickell's view, was how modest had been the distributional changes between 1989 and 2001, notwithstanding the alleged rise of the equity culture. Indeed, for much of the period such redistributions as did occur were upwards rather than downwards. 62 Confirming this, Wolff observes that 'the only segment of the population that experienced large gains in wealth [between 1983-1998 ] was the richest 20 per cent of households'. He calculates that during this period 'the richest 1 per cent received 53 per cent of the total gain in marketable wealth' .With the next 19 per cent receiving 39 per cent, the top quintile accounted for 91 per cent of the total growth in wealth, leaving only 9 per cent for the bottom four-fifths of the population. It is not surprising to discover, therefore, that the1990switnessed an explosion in the number of very rich households.63
59 Kennickell, n 54 above. The figures were compiled by adding direct holdings of publicly traded stocks (those held outside mutual funds, trusts, managed investment accounts, annuities and tax deferred retirement accounts) to holdings in IRAs, Keogh accounts and other pension accounts like 401(k) retirement accounts. 60 Wolff, n 52 above, 1-3. The SCF also reveals that in 1998 the average 'white' household had an income 76 per cent higher than that of the average 'non white' or 'Hispanic' household, but a net worth (assets less debts), including residence, over seven times higher. Both figures were much higher than in 1992, suggesting that racial gaps had widened. There is 'a vast racial wealth gap between households with otherwise similar demographic characteristics, like education and income', writes Henwood, n 52 above, 125-126. Because of its methodology the SCF provides little data on the gender distribution of wealth. 61 Wolff, n 52 above, 11. 62 The Forbes 400, who are excluded from the SCF analysis, did extraordinarily well: their average wealth (assets minus debts) rose by133 per cent between1989 and 2002.The 400 group as a whole controlled over 2 per cent of total personal wealth in 2002, up from1.6 per cent in 1989 and just 0.8 per cent in 1982. See Kennickell, n 54 above; see also Henwood, n 52 above,119-120. 63 See Wolff, n 52 above, 4; n 58 above, 3. example, the Inland Revenue has for many years produced estimates of the distribution of personal wealth, principal among them the so-called 'Series C' estimates of 'marketablewealth'.84 These underline the magnitude of the distributional inequalities in the UK. Some data on the distribution of financial wealth more specifically is provided by the BHPS, 'the most complete and up-to-date micro data for studying the The gini coefficient is a measure of the inequality of a distribution, ranging between 0 (no inequality) and 1 (all resources owned by one person). 84 'Marketable wealth' includes land and buildings, (directly owned) stocks and shares, trade assets, shares in private companies and partnerships, bank and building society accounts, cash, life assurance policies and cars and other durable goods; but excludes such things as occupational and state pensions as they are usually contingent rights which cannot readily be realised: see Inland Revenue Statistics (1998), para 18. The estimates are compiled by using an 'estate multiplier method 'which estimates the wealth of the living by regarding those who die in any one year as a sample of the whole population, with some adjustments to take account of the different mortality rates for people of different age, sex and marital status. the UK is 'extremely unequal'87 and very heavily concentrated at the top end of the distribution.88 Thus while mean net financial wealth -money held in savings and investments minus debt -was over d12,000, median net financial wealth, a more accurate guide to the middle of the distribution, stood at only d600. Indeed, a quarter of families were d200 or more in debt.89 Particularly striking were the differences between the distributions of income and wealth. In 2001, the ratio between the 90th (richest) and 50th (middle) percentiles of the income distribution was around two, whereas that in the net financial wealth distribution was 58.
The inequality in the distribution of wealth is thus 'huge' compared to that found in the distribution of income.90 Other studies have broadly confirmed these findings.91 As Table 6 shows, the distribution of wealth directly held in stocks and shares specifically is also 'highly skewed, with extreme concentrations once again in the wealthiest 5-10 per cent of households'.92 Thus although the top of the wealth distribution contains a relatively small number of households, in both the US and the UK these households hold and control 'a disproportionate amount of stocks'.93
The 1995 UK and 1984 US figures are virtually identical, suggesting that after the stock market surge of the early 1990s 'British households had stock wealth similar to American households ten years earlier'.95 There is also evidence that the skewing has not been greatly alleviated by the growth in occupational and personal pensions. Until the mid 1990s the Inland Revenue compiled estimates which took account of the capitalised value of private (mainly employment-related) and state pension rights (the 'Series D' and 'Series E' estimates). As one would expect, these show slightly lower levels of distributional inequality than the Series C estimates, but the percentage of wealth owned by the top ten per cent still hovered around 43 per cent throughout the period 1980-1994, and that owned by the top quarter at just under 70 per cent.96 Although, therefore, the base of the financial pyramid has undoubtedly widened in recent years and although the distribution of financial wealth in the UK is not quite as skewed as in the US, financial property and share ownership in the UK is still very heavily concentrated. Despite the rise of the equity culture, most British and American households possess 'very few financial assets', the top five per cent having more than 50 times those of the median household.97 Indeed, the concentration of financial asset ownership at the upper end of the British and American wealth distributions is, Banks, Blundell and Smith argue in their comparative study, the 'real story'. It is also, however, at this upper end that there are 'critical differences' between the two jurisdictions: the top fifth of American households have considerably more financial wealth than their counterparts in theUK.98 What is clear is that in both countries the 'public shareholder class 'upon whose emergence Hansmann and Kraakman attach so much weight, is not only not quite as 'broad' as sometimes suggested but is for the most part very shallow in its holdings. The result is that even within jurisdictions where direct and indirect share ownership has become more widespread, shareholder primacy remains in essence the primacy of a small, privileged elite; the primacy of the wealthiest ten percent. If one broadens and globalises the picture -in order to take account of the fact that a significant proportion of the interest and dividends accruing to financial property is derived from the labour of people elsewhere in the world, among the great majority of whom financial property ownership is virtually non-existent -this elite begins to look smaller still. Against this backdrop, any claims that we are entering an era of 'people's capitalism' are risible.
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF SHAREHOLDING The increasing illegibility of class
It would, however, be mistaken to conclude that nothing much has changed. As Hansmann and Kraakman suggest, the spread of stock ownership has contributed to the blurring of traditional class distinctions. Spurred on by the fear that by the time they retire (or require medical care, or lose their jobs) the supports provided by the welfare state will be inadequate, and encouraged no doubt by the steady rise in share prices in the 1980s and 1990s, more and more workers have invested money in the stock market, usually via institutions and retirement funds. As a result many now have a foot (or toe) in more than one class camp, being both wage-labourers and owners of modest amounts of capital. Some commentators, harking back to Peter Drucker's idea of 'pension-fund socialism',99 see in this an opportunity for worker-shareholders to press for the adoption of less rapacious, more socially responsible, worker-friendly corporate policies.100 At present, however, the money that wage-earners hand over to money managers simply joins the general pool and is managed no differently. Indeed, most workers have even more reason than wealthy investors to be concerned with getting the best possible returns from their modest financial assets, as this may well be the key to averting an impoverished old-age.101 Even more importantly, perhaps, these workers are very much in a minority, a modern-day 'labour aristocracy', for even in the wealthiest parts of the West, let alone elsewhere in the world, many working people have no financial property at all and many others have insufficient to fund comfortable retirements. While it would, therefore, be mistaken to assert, as did Drucker, that 'worker and capitalist are one and the same person', there is little doubt that the 'social security capital' or 'deferred labour income' that has flooded into the capital markets in recent years has served further to blur 'the traditional dividing line between wage-income and capital accumulation',102 contributing to what Richard Sennett has called the increasing 'illegibility' of class and class structures.103
The growth of shareholder power
The significance of widening of share ownership goes beyond its impact on class consciousness and identity, however. Even for the privileged minority of workers who benefit from sufficiently well-paid employment to become financial property owners, let alone for the much larger number around the world who do not, the growth in financial property ownership has had a downside. The nature of this can, perhaps, best be grasped by returning to the man on the sofa and the man who had yet to leave his pyjamas. Contrary to the claims made by the advertisement, of course, the man on the sofa was not working. But someone, somewhere certainly was, enabling the sofa bound man to make more money from the money that he had invested in the financial institution concerned. As Aristotle and the scholastics pointed out, money does not make more money by itself;104 lacking 'organs for generating any other piece', it is inherently unproductive. 105 The payment of interest entails taking part of the product of the labour of others. And it is, of course, precisely these unknown others, working in unknown places, in unknown industries, for unknown wages and in unknown conditions, who were generating the wealth to which the men in the advertisements were entitled to lay partial claim by virtue of their ownership of financial property. The adverts were thus vividly illustrative of the nature of the property forms which are now so central to modern capitalism and, indeed, of some of the reasons for the growing illegibility of class relations. Nowadays, the key to wealth and power is increasingly to be found in the ownership of that most abstract and impersonal of commodities, money -and, through it, of the intangible financial property forms that confer titles to revenue. It is these that enable some people in one part of the world to lay claim, through their rights to receive interest and dividends, to part of the product of the labour of others in other parts of the world while lying on their sofas or in their beds. Indeed, the adverts also shed light on the contemporary idea that the working class is disappearing, for more and more of the work that sustains the relatively privileged lifestyles of so many in the West now takes place offshore, in far-away sweatshops in places like China, which seems finally to have become a worker's state, though not perhaps in quite the way envisaged by Mao. Arguably, in much of the developed world class has become not so much illegible as near-invisible, its traces confined to the 'Made in . . .' labels attached to the things we consume.106 From this perspective, what we have seen in recent years, as Hansmann and Kraakman rightly say, is a significant increase in the power of the financial propertyowning, shareholder class, a development to which the torrent of social security capital entering the world's money markets has contributed. As more and more money has become concentrated in the hands of financial institutions and fund managers, so too has more and more power, power which has been used to exert intense pressure on corporate executives to maximise 'shareholder value' and on policymakers worldwide to 'open up markets'. The 'rentier function has become institutionalized' and with this 'the influence of the financial sphere has become greater [than] at any time since the 1920s'.107 This is reflected in Hansmann and Kraakman's observations about 'the new prominence of substantial institutions that have interests coincident with those of public shareholders' -institutions that are 'prepared to articulate and defend those interests' and that are 'acting increasingly on an international scale'. The result is that 'we now have not only a common ideology supporting shareholder-oriented corporate law, but also an organized interest group to press that ideology -an interest group that is broad, diverse, and increasingly international in its membership'.108 Operating through its institutional agents, the shareholder class has used a judicious mix of carrots and sticks to compel executives to seek to maximise shareholder wealth. Sometimes direct pressure is exerted by money managersso-called shareholder activism; on other occasions it is exerted indirectly through capital markets and the market for corporate control. These sticks have been supplemented by executive remuneration packages based around performance bonuses and share options, packages which have contributed not only to the increasing, self-interested, executive focus on maximising shareholder value but to the explosion in executive pay, particularly in jurisdictions boasting AngloAmerican style shareholder-oriented corporations and governance regimes. Crucially, however, as Wally Seccombe points out, while fund managers may have emerged as capitalism's 'new magnates', wielding tremendous power in financial markets, they are also compelled to submit to the disciplines of those markets.109 Like the corporate executives upon whom they exert pressure, fund managers have themselves become subject to ever greater competitive pressures and forced to maximise financial performance. Ultimately, of course, this entails extracting as much unpaid, surplus labour as possible from workers for distribution to shareholders and the owners of other forms of interest-bearing financial property.110 In this context, the growth in shareholder power is best seen as one aspect of the more general shift in the last thirty or so years in the balance of class forces around the world. Acting on behalf of the shareholder class, money managers have been snapping up the shares of companies whose top executives 'aggressively slash the payroll, shut-down unprofitable plants, sell off sideline businesses and use the profits extracted by ruthless cost-cutting to boost dividend payouts and repurchase company shares'.111 The desire to 'unlock shareholder value' has generated downsizing, re-engineering, spining-off and outsourcing, and seen labour come more than ever to be treated as nothing more than an expendable commodity. Wage bills have been cut, real wages have stagnated, job insecurity has increased, 'long-hours' cultures have emerged, and working practices and labour markets have been made more 'flexible'. Flexibility is, of course, primarily demanded not for but of workers, and with the growing financial pressures which have accompanied stagnating real wages and the decline of the welfare state generating a growing need for all adult householders to work, women in particular have suffered, entering the paid workforce while still shouldering the bulk of domestic labour. Paradoxically, then, while the rise of the equity culture has seen more and more working people become financial property owners, by contributing to the growing power of the shareholder class and more vigorous assertion of the shareholder primacy norm it has also intensified the market imperatives which have borne down so fiercely on working peopleworldwide.112 Financial power has been used to discipline workers and to create huge, new, amorphous, unorganized, easily exploited proletariats. The rise of the equity culture has thus been part of larger processes which have hardly operated for the benefit of workers qua workers even in the developed world, let alone for their less fortunate counterparts elsewhere. Until recently, writes Robert Reich, the norm had been . . . that if a company was highly profitable, workers could be assumed to have steady employment [and] if company profits increased, workers benefits and wages would increase with them . . . That is no longer the case . . . Highly profitable companies now shed thousands, if not tens of thousands, of workers. In doing so, companies are in certain cases doing nothing more than redistributing income from employees to shareholders.113
Indeed, it is not even clear that share and financial property ownership will enable the new labour aristocracy to realise its principal goal of a financially secure retirement, for in recent years the flood of pension money into the markets has con-tributed to the dramatic rise in stock market prices, greatly increasing the cost of buying titles to future revenue. Moreover, with the end of the bullmarket, many pension funds have been seriously depleted, contributing to the various collapses, scandals and scares of recent years. With a bear market a seemingly constant threat, and with many funds suffering from a declining ratio of contributors to beneficiaries, there is considerable risk of further problems in the future. Women, again, are especially vulnerable to poverty in old-age. Henwood sums things up with typically curt acerbity. 'It seems odd', he writes, 'that workers should be asked to trade a few extra percentage points return on their pension fund, on which they may draw some decades in the future, for 30 or 40 years of falling wages and rising employment insecurity'. As he says, the point of shareholder activism 'is to increase the profit share of national income and to claim a larger portion of that profit share for rentiers. Any gains to people of modest means are accidental'. The hints and suggestions in the debates surrounding corporate governance that the average stockholder is 'you and me' and that 'the portfolio managers demonized as greedy Wall Streeters are really managing all of society's savings for the long term interest of all' simply do not survive close scrutiny.114
Share ownership and the changing distribution of wealth
Given the grossly unequal distribution of financial property, it is not, perhaps, surprising that notwithstanding the broadening base of the financial pyramid, the last twenty or so years have seen a widening rather than a narrowing of wealth inequalities. In both the US and the UK, the 1980s saw a reversal of equalising trends which had begun in the 1930s.115 In the US, as Table 5 shows, the distribution of financial wealth was far more unequal in the mid 1990s than it had been a decade earlier,116 and by the millennium's turn the gap between 'the haves and the have-nots [was] greater than at any time since 1929'.117 James P. Smith, a Senior Economist at RAND, confirms that household wealth inequality in the US 'increased steadily' between1984-94, particularly within the upper half of the distribution. Moreover, the trend was 'even more dramatic' in financial assets alone, for while there was little change in the assets held by the typical household, the value of those held by the top five per cent increased by 50 per cent.118 'Contrary to popular perception', therefore, the 'go-go years of the 1980s and 1990s did not offer everyone a piece of the action'. They were, rather, 'a party for those at the very top of the wealth distribution'.119
As Smith says, the 'principal culprit' for this rise in inequality is 'easy to find': 'the stock market surge'.120 Poterba agrees. There were, he observes, sharp differences in the growth rates of the components of net worth between 1989 and 1998. The real value of tangible assets, for example, increased by only14 per cent and the real value of financial assets other than equities by 38 per cent. The real value of equities, on the other hand, rose by 262 per cent. More than 60 per cent of the wealth creation during this period was, therefore, attributable to the rising value of stock holdings. For most US households, however, these increases in stock values had, as Poterba points out, only 'modest wealth effects', as most households have 'no or very limited holdings of corporate stock'. In 1998, for example, less than 16 per cent of households held stock whose value exceeded the gross value of their home (and nearly half of these did not own a home at all) and under eight per cent of households both owned a home and stocks of greater value. Indeed, even an across-the-board increase in asset values would have 'only a modest effect on . . . most households, since most households h[ave] relatively few assets to beginwith'.121That the boom in stock prices brought significant benefits only to those at the very top of the wealth distribution was, then, entirely predictable. As James Davies and Anthony Shorrocks observe, because 'corporate stock is held disproportionately by the wealthiest families, wealth inequality can be expected to rise during stock market booms'.122 As, for the same reason, it can when the shareholder primacy norm is strengthened. It is clear that the last couple of decades have also seen a reversal of the long trend towards greater equality in the distribution of wealth in the UK. The first half of the twentieth century saw a considerable redistribution of wealth from the very rich (the top one per cent) to the upper middle classes (the top ten per cent), although in 1950 over half of personal wealth was still in the hands of the most affluent one per cent and 85 per cent in the hands of the richest tenth. The postwar period saw still further downward redistribution, with a continuing fall in the share of the richest one per cent and a significant increase in the share of the middle classes. The bottom 80 per cent of the adult population, for example, saw their share of total wealth rise from eight per cent in the 1930s to 35 per cent in the 1970s. But redistribution stalled in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and went into reverse in the 1990s. As Table 4 shows, between 1985 and 2001 the share of total personal wealth held by the richest one per cent increased from18 per cent to 23 per cent, the share of the richest five per cent from 36 per cent to 43 per cent, and the share of the richest ten per cent from 48-50 per cent to 55-56 per cent. At the same time, the share of the bottom half of the population fell from8-9 per cent to 5-6 per cent, with the result that the gini coefficient of inequality rose from64-65 to 69-70.123 The last two decades may have seen wealth creation on an unprecedented scale, primarily as a result of stockmarket gains and rising property values, but the gains have been very unevenly distributed.
It is harder to trace the changes in the distribution of UK financial wealth specifically since the 1980s because of the limited availability of relevant data, especially for the earlier years. However, by drawing on a variety of sources Banks, Blundell and Smith are able to cast some light on developments. Their conclusion is that 'strikingly, the bottom three quarters of the distribution of net financial worth remain [ed] close to constant in real terms' during the 1990s. This was in contrast to the US where this was true only for the bottom half. Moreover, in the UK substantial real increases in financial assets were to be found only 'at the 90th or even 95th percentiles and above'. There was, in other words, a lack of growth at both the bottom and middle of the distribution. Indeed, as of the late 1990s, one third of the British population still had no interest-bearing financial assets at all, and one tenth no assets of any kind. In short, in the UK the real gains from the stock market boom were probably concentrated in even fewer hands than in the US.124 Other studies looking only at financial assets have confirmed the growing inequalities and also highlighted the increasing numbers with no assets at all.125
ATRIUMPH FOR EFFICIENCYOR POWER?
Law-and-economic determinism: the new vulgar marxism?
What light does this cast on the growing strength of the shareholder primacy norm? According to Hansmann and Kraakman, the emerging consensus flows from the 'widespread disenchantment with a privileged role for managers, employees, or the state in corporate affairs' and the growing belief, based on 'logic and experience', that shareholder-oriented corporations are the best means to achieve the end of 'aggregate social welfare'. There are, they suggest, three factors at work: 'the failure of alternative models, the competitive pressures of global commerce; and the shift of interest group influence in favor of an emerging shareholder class'. Historically, their argument runs, various alternatives to the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation have been tried -some manager oriented (the US), some labour-oriented (Germany), some state-oriented (France, Japan), some a mixture of these (Netherlands). Ultimately, however, all have 'lost much of their normative appeal', as have the stakeholder models which emerged in their wake, because 'important economic forces' have made the virtues of the shareholder-oriented model 'increasingly salient'. The latter, they argue, has now come to be recognized as superior 'by force of logic, by force of example, and by force of competition'.126 On closer inspection, it becomes clear that these forces are at root one and the same. Like law-and-economic analyses in general, Hansmann and Kraakman's arguments are underlain by a belief in a politically neutral, trans-historical, marketbased, purely 'economic' rationality or logic, which is always struggling to assert itself, which common law judges often intuitively grasp and act upon, and which, if allowed free reign, operates to maximise aggregate social welfare. For Hansmann and Kraakman, this rationality provides 'persuasive reasons 'for believing that the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation, particularly if characterized by dispersed, 'outsider' shareholding, 'offers greater efficiencies than the prinicipal alternatives'. Being more market-based and more subject to (financial) market disciplines, shareholder-oriented corporations are, a priori, economically superior. In their view, confirmation of this is to be found in the economic performance in recent years of the 'developed common law jurisdictions' (with their shareholder-oriented corporations) relative to those of 'the principal East Asian and continental European countries' (with their more stakeholder-friendly models).
Hansmann and Kraakman recognise that not long ago German and Japanese firms 'were winning the competition' and that many commentators, including some in the US, were arguing that their corporate governance regimes and models of capitalism were superior. But, they claim, any suggestion that the more recent successes of the American economy might themselves prove ephemeral are based on a 'mistaken interpretation of the nature of economic competition in recent decades'. Previously, American corporations were manager-oriented and correspondingly less-than-efficient, hence their relatively poor performance in the1960s and 70s. Only in the last decade or so have they become genuinely shareholder-oriented, at which point, with competition becoming truly international for the first time, the state-and labour-oriented corporations of Japan and Germany have simply been'out-competed'.127 From this perspective, if market forces, and financial market forces in particular, are encouraged and permitted to operate without impediment, economic logic will generate convergence towards shareholder-oriented corporations. And this, Hansmann and Kraakman argue, is precisely what is happening. Equity markets are growing not only in Europe but throughout the developed world, and with this the economic logic of the market is inevitably asserting itself, subjecting corporations to its inexorable will and compelling convergence on the more efficient shareholder-oriented model. The latter's victory should 'not [therefore] come as a surprise'.128 On the contrary, it is the absence of Anglo-American, shareholder oriented, dispersed-ownership structures, rather than their presence, which is in need of explanation, hence the tendency of some recent US scholarship to focus on the reasons for their non-emergence in certain jurisdictions, something commonly attributed to legal, political and cultural impediments, such as inadequate minority shareholder protection129 and the overly-interventionist states and anti-shareholder ideologies associated with European social democracy. It is in this context that use is made of the idea of 'path dependency' to refer to the historical and cultural phenomena which have generated and sustained 'inefficient' (insufficiently shareholder-oriented) arrangements and impeded the emergence of market-based, economically 'rational' and 'efficient' (shareholder-oriented)
structures.130 The curious result is that Hansmann and Kraakman's analysis is characterised by the same kind of economic determinism which characterises, ormore accurately perhaps characterised, the unsophisticated, economistic and reductionist versions of Marxism associated with the base-superstructure metaphor. Like contemporary law-and-economics scholarship, these versions of Marxism also rigidly separated the determining economic sphere (base) from other social realms, the superstructural spheres of such things as politics and law; and like law-andeconomics, they too tended to offer essentially linear, economically determined accounts of historical development.
As it did for adherents of these versions of Marxism, history has for Hansmann and Kraakman an economically determined endpoint. As the fetters on economic rationality and progress are removed, the politically neutral, purely economic logic of the market will assert itself, bringing (corporate) history to an end.131 It is deeply paradoxical that this work at one level elevates the economic to the highest possible status, exemplifying what Emmanuel Todd has called 'the madness of economic determinism within [contemporary] American intellectual life',132while at another all but erasing that dimension of the economic concerned with income and wealth distribution.
History resumes
In the last few years, however, far from looking like a marker of corporate history's end, Hansmann and Kraakman's thesis has come to look uncomfortably like the transient product of a particular historical conjuncture -a manifestation of the collapse of Stalinism, of the much hyped, decade-long expansion of the American economy and of the euphoria engendered by the stock market boom and supposed emergence of a'New Economy'. In the second half of the1990s,whenHansmann and Kraakman were formulating their theory, equity prices were still rising and the American economy was still seemingly moving dynamically forward, in stark contrast to the economies of its major rivals, Japan and Germany. In the mid 1990s, however, the dollar, which had effectively been devalued by the American government in the mid 1980s at the time of the Plaza Accord, began to rise once more, depriving the US economy of 'the main motor . . . One difference between the two bodies of thought is that while in these deterministic versions of Marxism law is a reflection of 'the economic', in law-and-economics it is its servant and facilitator. 132 E. Todd, After the Empire (London: Constable, 2004) 10. 133 After decades of sustained growth and increasing productivity, in the 1970s the American economy entered a period of stagnation and declining profitability, in part because Japan and Germany had become highly effective economic competitors. The Plaza accord was aimed at making US manufacturing exports more competitive.
manufacturing profitability which followed. Indeed, the 'wealth effect' which resulted underlay the sharply increased household borrowing which enabled the economy to continue to grow. 'In effect', writes Robert Brenner, 'the Federal Reserve replaced the increase in the public deficit that was so indispensable to US economic growth during the 1980s, with an increase in the private deficit during the second half of the1990s -a kind of stock-market Keynesianism'. Bymid 2000, however, the chickens had begun to come home to roost: amidst the rubble of numerous dot.com companies the US stockmarket began a sharp descent and by early 2001the economy had fallen into recession, continuing downwards despite a dramatic easing of credit. As the current account deficit began to scale new heights, it became increasingly clear to many that the stockmarket boom of the1990swas in significant part a bubble and that the improved profitability was based not so much on miraculous productivity increases and a 'New Economy' but on 'dollar devaluation, a decade of close to zero wage growth, serious industrial shake-out, declining real interest rates and a turn to balanced budgets'.134 The 'miracle', such as it was, came, in other words, at the expense of America's major rivals and ordinary working people. Against this backdrop, Hansmann and Kraakman's extravagant claims began to look increasingly suspect.135 To make matters worse, by the millennium's turn it had become clear that the attempts, led by American corporate lawyers and financial economists, to introduce shareholder-oriented, Anglo-American corporate laws into Russia were going horribly wrong.136 And by late 2001, as American corporations were engulfed by one financial scandal after another, it had become evident that the stock market bubble had been inflated in part by accounting malpractices -malpractices considered by some endemic to the model of governance which evolved in the US in the 80s and 90s. For Hansmann and Kraakman and their ilk, the first few years of the 21st century have been, as Margaret Blair says, 'a sobering time'. Or at least they should have been, for as Todd suggests, recent events have had a disorienting psychological and ideological impact in the US, leading at times to a denial of reality.137 None of this, however, is to say that the shareholder primacy norm is not still gaining ground, nor that it will not continue to do so in the future. The significance of these events lies in the light that they cast on the reasons for this. As we have seen, Hansmann and Kraakman argue that the growing consensus in favour of shareholder-oriented corporations is rooted in the 'economic performance of the jurisdictions in which it predominates' in the 1990s when genuinely shareholderoriented corporations were finally brought into direct, international competition with alternative models and able conclusively to demonstrate their economic superiority. It has been this, they argue, that has persuaded more and more business, government and legal elites to adopt corporate laws dedicated to increasing long-term shareholder value.138 Recent events have undermined these claims and the 'efficient capital markets hypothesis' underlying them.139 It now seems clear that for prolonged periods in the 1990s the share prices of many corporations deviated rather radically from the 'real' underlying value of the corporations concerned, confirming that financial markets are not only less than 'efficient' but highly susceptible to fads and manipulation. Moreover, as Brenner says, 'occurring as it did in the face of the downward trend in profitability -and made possible by increases in corporate borrowing and household consumption that were both dependent upon the stock market bubble -much of the growth in investment in the second half of the decade was inevitablymisallocated'.140 In short, the 'economic case for the shareholder-oriented model of governance 'upon which Hansmann and Kraakman place such explanatory weight, has come to look increasingly suspect. There are nevertheless still reasons for taking some of Hansmann and Kraakman's arguments seriously, for what remains intact, of course, is their 'final source of ideological convergence': 'the rise of the shareholder class'. It is becoming increasingly clear that it has above all else been the growing power of finance, of the owners of financial property like shares, acting through their many and varied representatives, that has underlain the more rigorous imposition of the shareholder primacy norm.As Hansmann and Kraakman themselves observe, 'the persuasive power of the standard [shareholder-oriented] model has been amplified through its acceptance by a worldwide network of corporate intermediaries, including international law firms, the big five accounting firms, and the principal investment banks and consulting firms -a network whose rapidly expanding scale give it exceptional influence in diffusing the standard model of shareholder-centred corporate governance'.141 In this context, 'the market' has been used not as an instrument of 'efficiency' but as an instrument of private power; as one of the key mechanisms whereby financial property owners can exert pressure on workers, on corporate managers and on states to ensure they can appropriate a larger share of the product of industry and economic growth around the world. 'If the market is always right', writes Henwood, 'then doing what pleases it is ideal social policy, [and] what pleases it is maximising profits, which means keeping wages and other costs as low as possible'.
138 Hansmann and Kraakman, n 2 above, 450. 139 The efficient capital markets hypothesis is the financial theory which claims that as long as financial markets are sufficiently deep and liquid the market price of a corporation's shares will be a good measure of the corporation's true underlying value. 140 Brenner, n 134 above, 62. 'The scope and depth of over-capacity was thus very much extended, especially into high-technology industries both within and outside of the manufacturing sector, exacerbating the decline in profitability'. Previously, the dramatic growth of investment in telecommunications, the Internet, IT and so on had been seen as evidence of the ability of US financial markets to make long-term investments in innovation. 141 Hansmann and Kraakman, n 2 above, 451-52.
But what are costs to capital (and shareholders) are, of course, often benefits to others.142 The claim that the shareholder primacy norm benefits 'us all' 'in the long-run' by ensuring the maximisation of aggregate social wealth is, therefore, questionable. Indeed, 'to anyone who has worked for a corporation or observed the ways that corporations can externalise some of their costs onto employees, customers, or the communities where they operate', Margaret Blair suggests, 'the idea that maximising share value is equivalent to maximising the total social value created by the firm seems obviously wrong'. The long-run maximization of share value is not, she says, equivalent to maximising total social value. On the contrary, the in-the-long-run argument simply 'fails to make a case that shareholders' interest should be given precedence over other legitimate interests and goals of the corporation . . . Neither in theory nor in practice, is it true that maximizing the value of equity shares is the equivalent of maximizing the overall value created by the firm'.143 Indeed, in seeking to guarantee and extend the ability of rentiers to levy a charge on the productive system, recent trends in corporate governance arguably privilege their interests at the expense of the functional requirements of productive growth and investment.144 If it is far from clear whether the shareholder primacy norm really does benefit us all, however, it can hardly be disputed that it brings very real and substantial benefits to some. As we have seen, notwithstanding the widening of direct and indirect share ownership, the strengthening of the norm has disproportionately benefited a relatively small privileged minority -the elite ten or so percent who account for the vast majority of financial property and share ownership. It has, moreover done so at the expense of others.145 This suggests that shareholder primacy is more accurately seen as a device for achieving a particular distribution of the product of productive activity than as a mechanism for achieving economic efficiency. Its vigorous re-assertion, like the adoption of neo-liberal policies more generally, involves 'a shift in the internal social relationships within states in favour of creditor and rentier interests, with the subordination of productive sectors to financial sectors and with a drive to shift wealth and power and security away from the bulk of the working population'.146 Indeed, when one adopts a more global perspective to take account of the fact that a significant proportion of the interest accruing to financial property is derived from the labour of workers in less developed parts of the world, the rentier elite looks even smaller, even more exclusive, and even richer. The Human Noting that empirical studies made it clear that 'globalization' had been accompanied by an increase in within-country inequalities, Milanovic sought to discover whether it had been accompanied by an increase in world between-country inequality. Combining the data produced by household surveys in 91 countries for two years, 1988 and 1993, he found that world income inequality had indeed markedly increased during this period, the Gini coefficient rising from62.5 in 1988 to 66 in 1993. It was, moreover, between-country inequality that drove overall inequality up. Thus while the bottom five per cent of the world's population grew poorer, their real incomes falling by a quarter, the real income of the richest quintile grew by 12 per cent. By 1993, Milanovic calculates, the richest one per cent of the world's people received as much as the bottom 57 per cent; in other words, the less than 50 million richest got as much as the 2.7 billion poorest. In five years, the ratio between the average income of the world's richest and poorest five per cents increased from 78 to 114.148 Things do not seem to have improved since. The UNDP recently reported that three decades ago the people in the wealthiest countries were 30 times better off than those housing the poorest 20 per cent of the world's population but that by 1998 this gap had widened to 82 times. We now live in a world in which the wealth of its three richest individuals exceeds the combined GDPof the 48 least developed countries.149 While there are, of course, many aspects to the conflicts which currently permeate the world, we should not forget the role played by these economic inequalities and injustices, and by the measures which have to be taken by those who wish to sustain them. It may require 'an effort to discover within th[e] tangle of political violence and contests of power the stern laws of the economic process', but they are there.150
Corporate Governance and the New Imperialism
Much of the pressure for the adoption of rigorously shareholder-oriented corporate structures has, of course, come from the US, as part of the more general pressure exerted to compel governments worldwide to adopt neo-liberal economic and social policies. Initially, the 'structural adjustments' demanded of states as pre-conditions of investment, loans and aid were concerned only with broad economic policy -an emphasis on production for export, the removal of import controls, high interest rates, the privatization of public services so as to bring them within the orbit of foreign capital, financial 'deregulation' and so on.156 More recently, however, following the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, the adjustments demanded have begun increasingly to entail implementation of detailed measures aimed at financial sector reform and the promotion of so-called 'good governance', not least of course in the corporate sphere. This has precipitated even more radical losses of sovereignty. The rules of the whole financial system -from those on debt management, to those on trade and foreign aid, to those on corporate governanceare being redrawn to compel economies worldwide to bow to the needs of financial capital. Given the resulting IMF, World Bank and WTO imposed neo-liberal domestic transformations, not to mention growing US military interventionism,157 it is not, perhaps, surprising that new life has recently been breathed into the ideas of 'empire' and 'imperialism' -not only by critics but by supporters of US policies.158 In reality, 'globalization' has had rather less to do with free trade than with the careful control of trading relationships and the preservation of assymetries in exchange; driven less by a technological and purely 'economic' logic than by political power.159 This has, of course, been carefully concealed: just as the imperialism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was carefully garbed in the ideology of progress and a civilising mission, today's 'new imperialism' has its own ideological drapery, a neo-liberal melange which invokes ideas of market freedom, economic efficiency and universal well-being to justify the foisting upon others of institutional arrangements aimed at furthering the very particular interests of financial capital.160 It is precisely because of the growing power of finance and the capital-owning, 'shareholder class' that the shareholder primacy norm is likely to continue to strengthen in the future. As this happens, it will, no doubt, continue to be claimed by the neo-liberal clerisy that this benefits 'us all', 'in the end', by promoting economic efficiency and maximising aggregate social welfare. But the strengthening of the shareholder primacy norm is not producing, nor is it intended to produce, a happy and harmonious state in which everyone is better off. It is, rather, contributing to ever greater levels of inequality, both internationally and nationally -particularly in places like Britain and the US where neo-liberalism and the Anglo-American model of corporate governance have been so enthusiastically embraced. Against this backdrop, it is important that scholars of corporate governance do not permit deeply political processes to be passed off as the products of a politically neutral, purely economic logic or allow the distributional dimensions of corporate governance to be spirited off the agenda by the shamans of law-and-economics, those unremitting class warriors for the rich and powerful. Nor should they succumb to the complacent assumption that what exists works. They should, at the very least, ask 'works for whom?'. , 2003) ,115-117.Wood points out that globalization has, in reality, been as much about preventing as promoting global integration; as much about sustaining differential wage-levels and conditions of labour for profitable exploitation by capital. In this context, the nation state, far from becoming less important, has become pivotal. 160 The basic relationships of what he calls the 'Dollar-Wall Street Regime' can, Gowan argues, 'be understood without the slightest familiarity with neo-classical economics. Indeed, for understanding international and financial relations, lack of familiarity with the beauties and ingenuities of neo-classical economics is a positive advantage', n 144 above, 5.
